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Secure Short-Packet Communications for
Mission-Critical IoT Applications
Hui-Ming Wang, Qian Yang, Zhiguo Ding, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—In pervasive Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
the use of short packets is expected to meet the stringent
latency requirement in ultra-reliable low-latency communica-
tions; however, the incurred security issues and the impact of
finite blocklength coding on the physical-layer security have not
been well understood. This paper comprehensively investigates
the performance of secure short-packet communications in a
mission-critical IoT system with an external multi-antenna eaves-
dropper. An analytical framework is proposed to approximate
the average achievable secrecy throughput of the system with
finite blocklength coding. To gain more insight, a simple case
with a single-antenna access point (AP) is considered first, in
which the secrecy throughput is approximated in a closed form.
Based on that result, the optimal blocklengths to maximize the
secrecy throughput with and without the reliability and latency
constraints, respectively, are derived. For the case with a multi-
antenna AP, following the proposed analytical framework, closed-
form approximations for the secrecy throughput are obtained
under both beamforming and artificial-noise-aided transmission
schemes. Numerical results verify the accuracy of the proposed
approximations and illustrate the impact of the system parame-
ters on the tradeoff between transmission latency and reliability
under the secrecy constraint.
Index Terms—Finite blocklength, physical-layer security, ultra-
reliable low-latency communications, short-packet communica-
tions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past three decades have witnessed the prominent tech-
nical advancement of conventional mobile broadband (MBB)
characterized by high throughput and capacity. In the upcom-
ing fifth-generation (5G) era, the emphasis on the support of
Internet of Things (IoT) functionality becomes pronounced,
since the IoT is expected to enable new applications and
intelligent decision making by bridging diverse technologies
and connecting physical objects together [1]–[3]. To support
the IoT in 5G, two novel service categories, namely, ultra-
reliable low-latency communications (uRLLC) and massive
machine-type communications (mMTC), have been introduced
[4]. For the use case of mMTC, 5G solutions aim to provide
wireless connectivity to tens of billions of usually low-cost
energy-constrained machine-type devices such as sensors and
wearable devices [5]. In contrast, uRLLC requirements are
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closely connected with mission-critical machine-type appli-
cations with the emphasis on the stringent constraints of
reliability and latency, as typically required by intelligent
transportation and industry automation [2].
With the advent of IoT applications such as human-centric
intelligent wearables and smart healthcare, unprecedented se-
curity challenges, such as privacy leakage, financial loss, and
malicious invasion, arise [6], [7]. Due to the broadcast nature
of wireless communications, IoT communication systems are
particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping [8]. Conventionally,
security for IoT is strengthened through efficient cryptography
at the upper layers of the communication protocol stack [9].
However, secret key generation, distribution, and management
can be complicated and difficult to implement for large-scale
peer-to-peer IoT networks with many low-complexity nodes
like sensors [10]. Compared with cryptographic technologies
used at the upper layers, physical-layer security, as an al-
ternative to cryptography, is more appealing since perfect
secrecy is accomplished by exploiting the random nature of
wireless channels [11]. A fundamental quantity of interest in
physical-layer security is the secrecy capacity. Provided that
the transmission rate is less than the secrecy capacity and
the coding blocklength is sufficiently large, both the decoding
error probability at the legitimate receiver and the amount of
information leaked to the eavesdropper can be made arbitrarily
small [11], [12].
Despite the aforementioned security challenges, applying
physical-layer security measures in mission-critical IoT appli-
cations is nontrivial. As pointed out in [1], uRLLC and mMTC
scenarios feature short-packet communications, and supporting
short-packet transmission is the primary challenge in these
applications. From [2], [5] and [13], it is commonly known that
short packets used in IoT applications can potentially go down
to hundreds of bits. In this regard, channel codes or wiretap
codes conventionally adopted in cellular networks cannot be
used for short-packet communications. This is because these
codes are constructed for long packets (e.g., packet size
≫ 103 bytes) so as to approach Shannon’s channel capacity
or secrecy capacity. Furthermore, the classical information-
theoretic results for performance analysis are no longer valid
for short packets, due to the fact that the law of large
number cannot be leveraged for the case with finite packet
length (coding blocklength) [1]. This calls for a fundamentally
different design for secure short-packet communications in 5G
IoT applications compared with conventional data-rate-centric
systems.
2A. Related Work and Motivation
From the perspective of the physical layer, the design of
uRLLC services is arguably more challenging than mMTC due
to the fact that the two stringent constraints in mission-critical
IoT applications are conflicting. On one hand, to achieve low
latency the use of short packets becomes mandated, but the
channel coding gain can be severely degraded, which means
that it becomes difficult to ensure reliability. On the other
hand, more resources are required for re-transmission and
redundancy to improve reliability, but they incur greater la-
tency. Therefore, how to carefully balance the two constraints
and realize the goal of uRLLC with the aid of physical-layer
security is of significant interest for secure mission-critical IoT
applications.
Due to its potential practical applications, physical-layer
security has been extensively investigated in various communi-
cation systems [11], [14]–[17]. However, infinite blocklength
is assumed by most of the existing work on physical-layer
security. This assumption no longer holds for IoT applications
that require short-packet transmission.
During the past few years, prominent work has been done
to investigate the performance of short-packet communications
from an information-theoretic perspective [18]–[20]. In [18],
the maximal achievable channel coding rate was investigated
at a given blocklength and error probability. It is shown in [18]
that, unlike the classical Shannon formulation, the reliability
cannot be arbitrarily high in the finite blocklength regime,
and the incurred penalty on the maximal transmission rate
can be high. Under the case of multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) fading channels with finite blocklength coding, the
maximal achievable rate was analyzed in [19], and the tradeoff
between reliability, throughput, and latency was investigated
in [20]. These information-theoretic results were then used to
study the impact of finite blocklength coding on incremental
redundancy based hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ)
[21], wireless energy transfer [22], [23], two-way relaying
[24], and non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) [25], [26]
systems. The tradeoff between the sum rate and error proba-
bility in a multi-user downlink system with finite blocklength
coding was investigated in [27]. In addition, for the case
with no channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter,
the tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency
with finite blocklength coding was analyzed in [28]. However,
the above work does not take the transmission secrecy into
consideration.
So far, there is only limited work devoted to investigating
the secrecy rate under the case of finite blocklength [29]–
[33]. In [29], general achievability bounds for wiretap channels
with finite blocklength coding were obtained. Subsequently,
much effort has been put to improving the bounds [30], [31].
For given reliability and secrecy constraints under the finite
blocklength case, the tightest bounds and the second-order
coding rate for discrete memoryless and Gaussian wiretap
channels were obtained in [32] and [33]. However, to the best
of the authors’ knowledge no results are available on analyzing
practical system performance with these information-theoretic
results, nor has there been a comprehensive study of the
secrecy system throughput with finite blocklength coding.
Furthermore, how to design the blocklength in order to balance
the latency-reliability tradeoff under the secrecy constraint
remains unclear. The above issues motivate our work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we comprehensively investigate the average
achievable secrecy throughput of short-packet communications
in a secure IoT system, in which an access point (AP) aims
to securely communicate with an actuator in the presence of a
multi-antenna eavesdropper. We propose an analytical frame-
work to evaluate the secrecy throughput for both the single-
antenna and multi-antenna AP cases with finite-blocklength
transmission. Based on the derived approximations, the impact
of blocklength on the latency-reliability tradeoff under the
secrecy constraint is studied, and the secrecy throughput
is further optimized. Note that a comprehensive theoretical
performance study of the secrecy system throughput with finite
blocklength coding is provided in our paper, and the obtained
results can be used to guide the practical parameter design
in 5G new radio systems. Specifically, the novelties and main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) The information-theoretic results on finite-blocklength
bounds for wiretap channels are leveraged to analyze the
average achievable secrecy throughput of a practical IoT
system with a multi-antenna eavesdropper. Through the
proposed analytical framework, closed-form approxima-
tions for the secrecy throughput are derived for both cases
in which the AP has one and multiple antennas.
2) For the case with a single-antenna AP, the impact of
blocklength on the latency-reliability tradeoff under the
secrecy constraint is analyzed. In particular, the optimal
blocklength in terms of secrecy throughput maximization
is derived, and the impacts of the system parameters and
of the reliability and latency constraints on the optimum
are further analyzed.
3) For the case with a multi-antenna AP, the AP can employ
beamforming or artificial-noise-aided (AN-aided) transmis-
sion schemes for reliability and security enhancements. We
obtain a closed-form expression for the secrecy throughput
under this case, which holds for cases with arbitrary
numbers of antennas at the AP and the eavesdropper.
4) Numerical results are provide to verify the accuracy of the
proposed approximations and uncover the impact of the
system parameters on the tradeoff between transmission
latency and reliability under the secrecy constraint. It is
shown that adding more antennas at the AP can compensate
for the performance loss incurred by short-packet commu-
nications in a way.
C. Organization and Notation
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sections
II, we present the system model and the performance metrics
for the secure short-packet transmission. In Sections III and
IV, we investigate the secrecy throughput and its optimization
for the case with a single-antenna AP, respectively, while
the multi-antenna case is studied in Section V. Numerical
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Fig. 1. A secure IoT communication system in which an access point transmits
confidential short-packet information to a trusted actuator in the presence of
eavesdropping.
simulations and analysis are presented in Section VI before
the conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Notation: AT and AH represent the transpose and conjugate
transpose of a matrix A, respectively. E{·} denotes expectation,
and IK denotes a K-dimensional identity matrix. x ∼ CN(µ,Σ)
means that x is a random vector following a complex cir-
cular Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ.
X ∼ Exp(λ) denotes an exponentially distributed random
variable with rate λ, and X ∼ Gamma(k, θ) denotes a gamma-
distributed random variable with shape k and scale θ. Ei(x)
is the exponential integral function [34, eq. (8.211.1)], Γ(x) is
the gamma function [34, eq. (8.310.1)], γ(k, x) is the lower
incomplete gamma function [34, eq. (8.350.1)], and Γ(k, x)
is the upper incomplete gamma function [34, eq. (8.350.2)].
The ceiling and floor operations are denoted by ⌈·⌉ and ⌊·⌋,
respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRIC
A. System Model
We consider a secure downlink IoT communication scenario
as depicted in Fig. 1, in which an AP transmits confidential in-
formation to a trusted actuator while there exists an eavesdrop-
per aiming to intercept the ongoing transmission. We assume
that the actuator has a single antenna as expected in those
resource-constrained IoT applications, and the eavesdropper
is equipped with KE antennas for strong eavesdropping. The
case in which the AP is equipped with a single antenna will
be discussed in Sections III and IV, and the scenario with a
multi-antenna AP will be investigated in Section V.
For many IoT applications, the information transmitted from
the AP to the actuator is in short packets so as to achieve a low
latency (short delay). Under this case, the blocklength of the
channel coding is also finite. Specifically, the AP transmits B
information bits over N channel uses for each sporadic short-
packet transmission. The channels from the AP to the actuator
and the eavesdropper are assumed to undergo independent
quasi-static Rayleigh fading combined with large-scale path
loss. The fading process stays constant over one transmission
block (N channel uses) while it is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) among different blocks. Moreover, all the
channels in the system are corrupted by additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) in addition to fading and path loss.
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate under Finite Blocklength
It is well-known that as long as the transmission rate is
below the secrecy capacity and the codeword mapped from
the confidential message is sufficiently long, both the error
probability and information leakage can be made as small as
desired. However, when the transmission blocklength is finite,
decoding error and information leakage at the receiver are
inevitable.
According to [32] and [33], for a given blocklength N ,
a constraint on the decoding error probability of ǫ at the
legitimate receiver, and a secrecy constraint on the information
leakage of δ measured by the total variation distance1, a
lower bound on the maximal secret communication rate (an
achievable secrecy rate) can be approximated as follows:2
R(N, ǫ, δ) = CS −
√
VA
N
Q−1(ǫ)
ln2
−
√
VE
N
Q−1(δ)
ln2
, (1)
conditioned on γA > γE (otherwise the secrecy rate is zero),
where γA and γE are the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at
the actuator and the eavesdropper, respectively. In (1), CS =
log2(1+γA)− log2(1+γE) denotes the secrecy capacity, which
characterizes the maximal secrecy rate at which information
can be securely and reliably transmitted with codewords of
infinite blocklength; VX = 1 − (1 + γX )−2, X ∈ {A, E}, is the
channel dispersion which measures the stochastic variability of
the channel relative to a deterministic channel with the same
capacity [18]; Q−1(·) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q-function
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2π
e−
t2
2 dt.
The expression in (1) implies that compared with the se-
crecy capacity, realizing the targeted decoding error probability
ǫ and satisfying the secrecy constraint on the information
leakage δ respectively incur a penalty term on the achievable
secrecy rate with finite blocklength coding, which is propor-
tional to 1/
√
N . When the blocklength N approaches infinity,
the penalty diminishes and the achievable secrecy rate given in
(1) asymptotically coincides with the secrecy capacity CS , as
expected. Moreover, according to (1), the achievable secrecy
rate decreases as the reliability and secrecy constraints become
more stringent, i.e., smaller ǫ and δ.
C. Performance Metrics and Problem Formulation
In this work, we use secrecy throughput, i.e., the average
secrecy rate at which the data packet is reliably transmitted
under a certain secrecy constraint, as the main metric to
analyze the performance of systems with secure short-packet
communications. Recalling that the AP transmits B informa-
tion bits in total for each sporadic short-packet transmission,
its transmission rate is then given by R = B/N once the block-
length N is determined. By substituting R = B/N into (1), the
1Its formal mathematical definition was given in [32, eq. (8)], which
describes the statistical independence between the transmitted confidential
message and the eavesdropper’s observation.
2The equation in [32, eq. (40)] is adapted as here for the complex-valued
channel by noting that the equivalent blocklength gets doubled compared with
the real-valued one with the same SNR.
4corresponding decoding error probability at the actuator under
the tolerance of information leakage δ is characterized by
ǫ = Q
(√
N
VA
(
ln
1 + γA
1 + γE
−
√
VE
N
Q−1(δ) − B
N
ln2
))
, (2)
for γA > γE . When γA ≤ γE , the secrecy capacity is zero
and we simply set ǫ = 1 for this trivial case. The average
achievable secrecy throughput measured in bits per channel
use (BPCU) is then given by
T = EγA,γE
[
B
N
(1 − ǫ)
]
=
B
N
(1 − ǫ¯), (3)
where ǫ¯ , EγA,γE [ǫ] denotes the average decoding error
probability.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the tolerance of
information leakage is fixed as δ ∈ (0, 1/2) to impose a
stringent secrecy constraint. For a fixed message size of B
bits, the blocklength N actually captures the corresponding
physical-layer transmission latency measured in channel uses
[23], [25]. It can be easily seen from (2) that the decoding
error probability decreases as N increases, while a larger N
reduces the transmission data rate and incurs a longer latency.
Therefore, it is important to investigate the impact of N on the
secrecy throughput defined in (3), which strikes a fundamental
tradeoff between transmission latency and decoding error.
Furthermore, there is a similar rate-reliability tradeoff for the
total number of transmitted bits B, since the decoding error
probability is an increasing function of B from (2). The values
of N and B should be carefully chosen so as to maximize the
average secrecy throughput.
III. ANALYSIS FOR THE SINGLE-ANTENNA CASE
In this section, the secrecy throughput for the case with
a single-antenna AP under finite blocklength is investigated.
We first find a closed-form approximation for the secrecy
throughput in Section III-A, and then some insight is obtained
by carefully studying the secrecy throughput in the high-SNR
regime as well as in the case with infinite blocklength in
Sections III-B and III-C, respectively.
A. Secrecy Throughput Approximation
For the single-antenna case, the channels from the AP
to the actuator and the eavesdropper are represented by
hA = d
−α/2
A
gA and hE = d
−α/2
E
gE , respectively, where dX
for X ∈ {A, E} denotes the distance from the AP, α denotes
the large-scale path-loss exponent, and gA ∼ CN(0, 1) and
gE ∼ CN(0, IKE ) account for the small-scale Rayleigh fading.
The SNRs at the actuator and the eavesdropper are then
characterized by
γA =
P |hA|2
σ2
A
= ρA |gA |2, (4a)
and
γE =
P‖hE ‖2
σ2
E
= ρE ‖gE ‖2, (4b)
respectively, where P is the transmit power at the AP. For
X ∈ {A, E}, σ2
X
is the power of the AWGN at the receiver,
and ρX , Pd−αX /σ2X . From (4), we have γA ∼ Exp(1/ρA)
and γE ∼ Gamma(KE, ρE ). The secrecy throughput in (3) can
thereby be calculated as follows:
T =
B
N
∫ ∞
0
Ψ(y) y
KE−1e−y/ρE
ρ
KE
E
Γ(KE)
dy, (5)
where
Ψ(y) ,
∫ ∞
y
(
1 − ǫγA |γE=y(x)
) 1
ρA
e
− x
ρA dx (6)
and ǫγA |γE=y(·) is the decoding error probability in (2) with
respect to (w.r.t.) γA conditioned on γE = y. Note that the
lower limit of the integral Ψ(y) is y since we have set ǫ = 1
when γA ≤ γE .
To proceed with (5), the main obstacle lies in the calcula-
tion of the integral (6), where the function ǫγA |γE (·) has an
intractable form. To circumvent this problem, we first give an
approximation of ǫγA |γE (·) in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: A first-order approximation for ǫγA |γE (x) is given
as follows:
ǫγA |γE (x) ≈ PγA |γE (x)
,

1, x < 1
2k
+ x0,
1
2
+ k(x − x0), x ∈
[
1
2k
+ x0,− 12k + x0
]
,
0, x > − 1
2k
+ x0,
(7)
where
x0 , e
√
VE
N
Q−1(δ)+ B
N
ln2(1 + γE ) − 1, (8)
and
k ,
dǫγA |γE (x)
dx

x=x0
= −
√
N
2πx0(x0 + 2)
. (9)
Proof: This approximation follows from the linearization
technique used in [21] and [22] which have not taken the
secrecy constraint into account.
With the approximation in (7), the difficulty now lies in the
fact that the lower limit of the integral Ψ(y) is not a constant.
To further simplify Ψ(y), we approximate it by changing the
lower limit of the integral from y to 0 based on the fact that
ǫγA |γE=y(x) > 1/2 when x < y. Moreover, according to (2)
we know that ǫγA |γE=y(x) → 1 when N → ∞ and x < y,
while ǫ → 1 as N → 0. Therefore, this approximation is
expected to be tight for a wide range of N , which will be
validated by the simulations shown in Fig. 2. With the aid of
the above approximations, the following theorem provides an
approximated secrecy throughput.
Theorem 1: The secrecy throughput in (5) can be approxi-
mated as follows:
T ≈ B
N
∫ ∞
0
kρAe
− x0
ρA
(
e
1
2kρA − e−
1
2kρA
) 
γE=y
y
KE−1e−y/ρE
ρ
KE
E
Γ(KE)
dy.
(10)
5Proof: By leveraging Lemma 1 and partial integration,
the integral Ψ(γE ) can be approximated as follows:
Ψ(γE ) ≈ 1 −
∫ ∞
0
PγA |γE (x)d
(
1 − e− xρA
)
= 1 + k
∫ − 1
2k
+x0
1
2k
+x0
(
1 − e−
x
ρA
)
dx
= kρAe
− x0
ρA
(
e
1
2kρA − e−
1
2kρA
)
. (11)
The secrecy throughput can then be approximated by substi-
tuting (11) into (5).
Note that the analytical result provided in Theorem 1 is
applicable to the case with arbitrary blocklength, but its form
is quite complicated. In order to obtain more insight about
the secrecy throughput, some approximations in the moderate-
blocklength regime, i.e., 102 ≤ N ≤ 103, will be carried out.
It is important to point out that the case with 102 ≤ N ≤ 103,
i.e., a data packet containing hundreds of bits, is particularly
important to latency-critical IoT applications as shown in [2].
Therefore, in the moderate-blocklength regime the parameter
|k | can be large based on the fact that |k | is an increasing
function of N according to (9), and we further have e
± 1
2kρA ≈
1± 1
2kρA
especially when ρA is large. Accordingly, when |kρA |
is large (the relative error for the approximation of Ψ(γE ) is
smaller than 5% when |kρA | > 1), Ψ(γE ) in (11) can be further
approximated as follows:
Ψ(γE ) ≈ e−
x0
ρA . (12)
By leveraging (12), a closed-form approximation for the
secrecy throughput of the system with a single-antenna AP
is then given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: When |kρA | is large, the secrecy throughput
of the system with a single-antenna AP under finite block-
length can be approximated as follows:
T ≈ B
Nρ
KE
E
Γ(KE)
(
M1
2
M2∑
n=1
(
̺M2 f
(
M1
2
(tn + 1)
) √
1 − t2n
)
+
1
̟
KE
2
e
−̟1−1
ρA Γ(KE, ̟2M1)
)
, (13)
where M1 is a sufficiently large parameter to ensure VE ≈
1 when γE > M1, M2 is a parameter for the complexity-
accuracy tradeoff, ̺M2 ,
π
M2
, f (z) , zKE−1e−
(
x0(z)
ρA
+
z
ρE
)
with
x0(z) , x0 |γE=z, tn , cos
(
2n−1
2M2
π
)
, ̟1 , e
Q−1 (δ)√
N
+
B
N
ln2
, and
̟2 ,
̟1
ρA
+
1
ρE
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Our proposed analytical framework for analyzing the se-
crecy throughput and obtaining a closed-form expression for
short-packet communications is summarized in Table I. The
expression given in Proposition 1 takes a cumbersome form,
and it is still difficult to gain any insight on the system
performance from (13). In what follows, we aim to further
simplify the expression of the secrecy throughput so as to
analytically investigate the intrinsic latency-reliability tradeoff
under the secrecy constraint for the system with finite block-
length coding.
TABLE I
PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYZING THE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
1. Formulate the secrecy throughput according the definition given in
(3);
2. For any given eavesdropper’s SNR γE , approximate the decoding
error probability ǫγA |γE (x) ≈ PγA |γE (x) w.r.t. the actuator’s SNR
γA according to Lemma 1;
3. Approximate the integral Ψ(γE ) by changing the lower limit of the
integral from y to 0, and then the closed-form expression of Ψ(γE )
can be directly calculated (in the single-antenna AP case) or further
approximated by using the first-order Riemann integral (in the multi-
antenna AP case);
4. By substituting the result of Ψ(γE ) into the expression of the secrecy
throughput, the closed-form expression of T can be further obtained
by splitting the integral and using Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature.
Fig. 2. The average secrecy throughput T and its approximations under the
single-antenna case versus blocklength N with system parameters: (a) KE =
2, ρA = 10 dB, and δ = 10
−2; (b) KE = 4, ρA = 10 dB, and δ = 10−2; (c)
KE = 2, ρA = 6 dB, and δ = 10
−2; (d) KE = 2, ρA = 10 dB, and δ = 10−4.
The total transmitted bit number is B = 200 bits, ρE = 3 dB, M1 = 10, and
M2 = 20.
Since the eavesdropper is equipped with multiple antennas
and maximal-ratio combining is employed, its SNR can be
considerably large especially when the AP has a large transmit
power. In this regard, a small parameter M1 can be chosen
in Proposition 1 without loss of too much accuracy. Follow-
ing this intuition, we provide another approximation for the
secrecy throughput in the following proposition, in which a
simple form is developed to gain more insight and to conduct
optimization for the secrecy system performance with finite
blocklength coding.
Proposition 2: When |kρA | and the average SNR at the
eavesdropper E [γE ] = KE ρE are large, the secrecy throughput
of the system with a single-antenna AP under finite block-
length can be further approximated as follows:
T ≈ B
N (ρE̟2)KE
e
−̟1−1
ρA . (14)
Proof: The result can be directly obtained by setting M1 =
0 in (13) and by noting that Γ(KE, 0) = Γ(KE ).
As depicted in Fig. 2, the approximations provided in
Propositions 1 and 2 match well with the simulations for a
wide range of N . From Fig. 2, the secrecy throughput is an
increasing function of ρA and information leakage δ, while
6it decreases with an increase in KE . Moreover, there exists
an optimal blocklength to maximize the secrecy throughput,
which will be analytically studied in Section IV. Because of
the accuracy of the results provided in Proposition 2 and their
analytical tractability, we will use (14) to optimize the system
performance hereinafter.
B. High-SNR Regime
When the transmit power P at the AP approaches to infinity,
we know that both ρA and E [γE ] approach to infinity. Under
this regime, the approximation in (14) is accurate for a wide
range of N according to the condition in Proposition 2.
Therefore, by letting P in (14) go to infinity, the average
secrecy throughput in the high-SNR regime is given by
T P→∞ =
B
N
(
1 − ǫ¯P→∞
)
, (15)
where the average decoding error probability in the high-SNR
regime is denoted by
ǫ¯P→∞ = 1 −
(
1 +
σ2
A
σ2
E
(
dA
dE
)α
̟1
)−KE
. (16)
From (16) we know that the average decoding error probability
cannot decrease to zero as the transmit power at the AP
approaches infinity, since both the SNRs at the actuator and
the eavesdropper increase at the same time. Moreover, in the
high-SNR regime, the secrecy throughput increases with dE
and δ, while it is a decreasing function of dA and KE .
C. The Classical Case with Infinite Blocklength
To gain more insight on the asymptotic system performance
and understand the connection between the cases with finite
and infinite blocklength, in this subsection we focus on the
classical case with infinite blocklength, i.e., the blocklength
N approaches to infinity.
When N → ∞, we know that the decoding error probability
ǫ → 0 as long as γA > γE (otherwise ǫ → 1) from (2).
Therefore, with infinite blocklength, the secrecy throughput
defined in (3) can be expressed as follows:
TN→∞ =
B
N
P{γA > γE } = B
N
(
ρA
ρA + ρE
)KE
. (17)
Note that the result given in (17) can be directly obtained from
(14) by letting N → ∞ for any positive δ, which verifies the
accuracy of our approximation in Proposition 2 in the large-
blocklength regime.
It is also worth noting that the result in (17) coincides
with the case of infinite blocklength, which is expected. With
infinite blocklength and appropriate transmission rates, there
is no decoding error once the secrecy capacity CS is not zero,
namely, γA > γE . Moreover, under the condition γA > γE
since the transmission rate B
N
→ 0 which is smaller than
CS as N → ∞, the rate BN is always achievable without any
information leakage to the eavesdropper, i.e., the result in (17)
holds for any positive δ.
IV. OPTIMIZATION FOR THE SINGLE-ANTENNA CASE
In this section, the system performance under the single-
antenna case is maximized by optimizing the blocklength. We
first investigate unconstrained secrecy throughput optimization
in Section IV-A, and then throughput optimization is studied
with the reliability and latency constraints in Section IV-B.
A. Unconstrained Secrecy Throughput Optimization
As indicated in Section II-C, blocklength N plays an im-
portant role in optimizing the secrecy throughput, where a
balanced tradeoff between transmission latency and decoding
error needs to be realized. In particular, we focus on the
question how to choose blocklength N for secrecy throughput
maximization when the message size is fixed to be B bits
in total. The following theorem characterizes the optimal
blocklength which maximizes the secrecy throughput.
Theorem 2: The secrecy throughput T in (14) is a quasi-
concave function of the relaxed continuous blocklength N .
The optimal blocklength can be chosen as the one from
{⌈N∗⌉, ⌊N∗⌋} that yields the largest secrecy throughput, where
N∗ > 0 is the unique root of
Ξ(N) , ̟1
ρA
(
Q−1(δ)
2
√
N
+
B
N
ln2
) (
1 +
KE
̟2
)
− 1 = 0. (18)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
According to Theorem 2, the optimal blocklength can be
obtained through a bisection search. With the aid of the
relation in (18), insight on the behavior of N∗ is developed
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The optimal N∗ increases with ρE , KE , and
B, while it decreases as P, ρA, and δ < 0.5 increase.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
From Corollary 1, we learn that the decoding error becomes
more pronounced compared with transmission latency when
the average SNR at the eavesdropper KE ρE or the transmission
bit number B gets larger. Thus, the optimal blocklength N∗
becomes larger accordingly, which aligns with our intuition.
Contrarily, when either the transmit power P at the AP, the
SNR at the actuator ρA, or the tolerance of the information
leakage δ increases, the probability of decoding error decreases
and the optimal blocklength N∗ becomes smaller in order to
reduce transmission latency.
After obtaining the optimal blocklength according to The-
orem 2, the optimal secrecy throughput denoted by T (N∗)
can be evaluated by substituting N∗ in (14). The following
corollary provides the impact of the related system parameters
on T (N∗).
Corollary 2: The optimal T (N∗) decreases with an increase
in ρE or KE , while it increases with B, δ, P, and ρA.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
According to the partial derivative of the secrecy throughput
T w.r.t. the total number of transmitted bits B given by (44)
in the proof of Corollary 2, we learn that T is also a quasi-
concave function of B. Therefore, a similar conclusion can
be drawn when we optimize B to maximize T for a fixed
N as in Theorem 2. Furthermore, it is interesting to see
that from Corollary 2, the optimal T (N∗) is a monotonically
7increasing function of B instead of being quasi-concave once
the blocklength is chosen as the optimal one. An illustration
of the impact of these system parameters will be shown in
Fig. 4 in Section VI-A.
So far, we have investigated the optimization of the secrecy
throughput without any reliability and latency constraints, i.e.,
for any average decoding error probability and blocklength. In
the next subsection, we will focus on the scenario with these
practical constraints.
B. Optimization Under Reliability and Latency Constraints
For some short-packet communication applications such as
remote control and industrial automation, high-reliability and
low-latency communication is favorable, which aligns with
the requirements of uRLLC. In this subsection, we focus on
the secrecy throughput optimization under these application
scenarios.
Mathematically, we aim to solve the following optimization
problem
maximize
N ∈N+
T (19a)
s.t. ǫ¯ ≤ ζǫ , (19b)
N ≤ ζN , (19c)
where (19b) accounts for the decoding reliability constraint
and ζǫ is the maximum tolerance for the average decoding
error probability ǫ¯ , while (19c) captures the constraint of
physical-layer transmission latency by imposing a maximum
tolerable blocklength ζN . Note that to make problem (19)
tractable, the other latency parameters, such as the propagation
latency and the processing time for encoding and decoding, are
assumed to be fixed and have been absorbed into parameter
ζN .
With the approximation given in Proposition 2, we have
ǫ¯ ≈ 1− 1(ρE̟2)KE e
−̟1−1
ρA , which is a decreasing function of N .
Therefore, problem (19) is then recast as follows:
maximize
N ∈N+
T (20a)
s.t. ǫ¯−1(ζǫ ) ≤ N ≤ ζN, (20b)
where ǫ¯−1(·) is the inverse function of ǫ¯(N) with ǫ¯(N) being
the function of ǫ¯ w.r.t. N . Note that the solution to problem
(20) exists only when
⌈
ǫ¯−1(ζǫ )
⌉ ≤ ⌊ζN ⌋. According to the
conclusion given in Theorem 2, the following corollary shows
the optimal blocklength for problem (20).
Corollary 3: When
⌈
ǫ¯−1(ζǫ )
⌉ ≤ ⌊ζN ⌋, the optimal block-
length for problem (20) is given by
N# =

⌈
ǫ¯−1(ζǫ )
⌉
, N∗ ≤ ⌈ǫ¯−1(ζǫ )⌉ ,
argmaxN ∈{ ⌈N∗ ⌉, ⌊N∗ ⌋ } T (N),
⌈
ǫ¯−1(ζǫ )
⌉
< N∗ < ⌊ζN ⌋ ,
⌊ζN ⌋ , N∗ ≥ ⌊ζN ⌋ ,
(21)
where N∗ is defined in Theorem 2.
Proof: We first relax N in problem (20) as a continuous
positive value. Then the result directly follows from the fact
that the secrecy throughput T is a quasi-concave function of
the continuous N according to Theorem 2.
The optimal average secrecy throughput obtained from
Corollary 3 under the reliability and latency constraints will
be shown in Fig. 6 in Section VI-A. When jointly optimizing
the blocklength N and transmitted bit number B for secrecy
throughput maximization, we remark that Corollary 3 can be
easily expanded by conducting a one-dimensional search for
B and then finding the optimal N for each fixed B according
to (21).
V. ANALYSIS FOR THE MULTI-ANTENNA CASE
In this section, we focus on the secrecy throughput with
a multi-antenna AP under finite blocklength. Compared with
the single-antenna case, the transmission security of the system
can be greatly improved when the AP has multiple antennas
since the extra spatial degrees of freedom can be leveraged.
We consider a scenario where the AP is equipped with KA
antennas. As in the single-antenna case, we assume that the
AP has the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper only due to
its passive nature.3 The channels from the AP to the actuator
and the eavesdropper are similarly defined as hT
A
= d
−α/2
A
gT
A
and HE = d
−α/2
E
GE , respectively, where each element in
gT
A
∈ C1×KA and GE ∈ CKE×KA follows an i.i.d. CN(0, 1)
distribution.
To degrade the performance of the eavesdropper while en-
suring the reliability of the signal reception at the actuator, the
AP can leverage either the maximal-ratio transmission (MRT)
beamforming scheme or an AN-aided transmission scheme
as in [35], [36]. Specifically, in the AN-aided transmission
scheme, the AP uses MRT to transmit confidential signal and
injects AN in the nullspace of the legitimate communication
channel to confuse the eavesdropper. Accordingly, the de-
signed transmit signal under the two transmission schemes
can be written as the following unified expression:
x =
√
ηPws +
√
(1 − η)PUv, (22)
where s is the information-bearing signal with unit power,
w , gA/‖gA‖ is the MRT beamforming vector, v ∼
CN(0, 1
KA−1 IKA−1) is the injected (KA − 1) × 1 AN vector to
confuse the eavesdropper, and η is the power allocation factor.
The columns of U ∈ CKA×(KA−1) span the nullspace of hT
A
, and
the columns of W , [w,U] forms an orthogonal basis. Note
that the AN-aided transmission scheme reduces to the MRT
beamforming one when η = 1 is set in (22).
Given the transmit signal in (22), the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratios (SINR) at the actuator is represented as
follows:
γA =
ηP‖hA‖2
σ2
A
= ηρA‖gA‖2. (23)
As for the eavesdropper, its received signal is given by
yE =
√
ηPHEws +
√
(1 − η)PHEUv + nE, (24)
3Compared with the full CSI, statistical CSI is more practical to be obtained.
This is because statistical CSI depends heavily on the propagation environment
and is expected to vary more slowly with time than instantaneous CSI, which
can be acquired in practical communication scenarios. This is also a common
assumption in the literature of physical-layer security [11], [14]–[17].
8where nE ∼ CN(0, σ2EIKE ) accounts for the AWGN. By em-
ploying the minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) receiver,
the corresponding SINR at the eavesdropper is expressed as
follows:
γE
= ηPwHHHE
( (1 − η)P
KA − 1
HEUU
HHHE + σ
2
EIKE
)−1
HEw
= ηwHGHE
(
1 − η
KA − 1
GEUU
HGHE +
1
ρE
IKE
)−1
GEw. (25)
Following steps similar to the ones for the single-antenna
case, by leveraging Lemma 1 and partial integration, we first
approximate the integral Ψ(γE ) as follows:
Ψ(γE ) ≈ 1 + k
∫ − 1
2k
+x0
1
2k
+x0
FγA (x)dx, (26)
where FγA(x) = 1Γ(KA)γ(KA,
x
ηρA
) represents the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) of γA due to ‖gA‖2 ∼
Gamma(KA, 1). By noting that in the moderate-blocklength
regime the parameter |k | can be large based on the fact that |k |
is an increasing function of N according to (9), the first-order
Riemann integral approximation
∫ b
a
f (x)dx ≈ (b−a) f ( a+b
2
) is
expected to be tight. Following this, we further approximate
(26) as follows:
Ψ(γE ) ≈ 1 − FγA (x0). (27)
Then the secrecy throughput in the multi-antenna case can be
calculated according to
T =
B
N
∫ ∞
0
Ψ(y)dFγE (y), (28)
where FγE (·) is the CDF of the random variable γE . Its specific
expression for any antenna number at the eavesdropper KE is
provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The CDF of the SINR at the eavesdropper γE
under the AN-aided transmission scheme can be found as
follows:
FγE (x) = 1 − e−
1
ηρE
x
KE∑
n=1
An(x)
(n − 1)!
(
x
ηρE
)n−1
, (29)
where
An(x) ,

1, KE ≥ KA − 1 + n,∑KE −n
m=0 (KA−1m )(τx)m
(1+τx)KA−1 , KE < KA − 1 + n,
(30)
with τ , η
−1−1
KA−1 .
Proof: The result directly follows from [37, eq. (11)].
With the aid of Lemma 2, an approximation for the secrecy
throughput under the multi-antenna case is given in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 3: The secrecy throughput of the system with a
multi-antenna AP under finite blocklength can be approxi-
mated as follows:
T ≈ B
N
(
M1
2
M2∑
n=1
(
̺M2g
(
M1
2
(tn + 1)
) √
1 − t2n
)
+
1
Γ(KA)
Γ
(
KA,
̟1(M1 + 1) − 1
ηρA
)
− ̟1e
−̟1−1
ηρA
(ηρA)KAΓ(KA)
×
KA−1∑
p=0
(
KA − 1
p
) (
̟1
̟1 − 1
)p KE∑
n=1
(̟1 − 1)KA−1
(n − 1)!(ηρE)n−1
Θn
)
,
(31)
where M1 is a sufficiently large parameter to ensure VE ≈ 1
when γE > M1, M2 is a parameter for the complexity-accuracy
tradeoff, ̺M2 ,
π
M2
, g(z) , FγE (z) fγA (x0(z)) x′0(z) with
fγA (x) =
xKA−1e−
x
ηρA
(ηρA)KAΓ(KA)
(32)
being the probability density function (PDF) of γA and
x′0(y) ,
∂x0
∂γE

γE=y
= e
√
VE (y)
N Q
−1(δ)+ BN ln2
(
1 +
Q−1(δ)√
N(1 + y)
√
y(y + 2)
)
(33)
with VE (y) , VE |γE=y, tn , cos
(
2n−1
2M2
π
)
, and ̟3 ,
̟1ρE+ρA
ηρAρE
.
The calculation of integral Θn in (31) is discussed as follows:
1) The case of η = 1 (MRT beamforming):
Θn = Θ1,n ,
1
̟
n+p
3
Γ(n + p, ̟3M1), for 1 ≤ n ≤ KE . (34)
2) The case of η , 1 and KE < KA: For 1 ≤ n ≤ KE ,
Θn = Θ2,n
,
KE−n∑
m=0
(
KA − 1
m
)
τme−̟3M1
(1 + τM1)KA−1
×
p+m+n−1∑
q=0
(
p + m + n − 1
q
)
M
p+m+n−1−q
1
(
1 + τM1
τ
)q+1
× Γ(q + 1)U
(
q + 1, q − KA + 3, 1 + τM1
τ
̟3
)
, (35)
where U(·, ·, ·) is the Tricomi’s (confluent hypergeometric)
function and can be easily evaluated by computational soft-
ware.
3) The case of η , 1 and KE ≥ KA:
Θn =
{
Θ1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ KE − KA + 1,
Θ2,n, KE − KA + 2 ≤ n ≤ KE .
(36)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix E.
We remark that the result presented in Theorem 3 is general
and holds for all possible values of η and KE under KA > 1.
Fig. 3 plots the impact of blocklength on the average secrecy
throughput and its approximation in Theorem 3 with a multi-
antenna AP. It can be seen from the figure that the theoretical
9Fig. 3. The average secrecy throughput T and its approximation under the
multi-antenna case versus blocklength N with different antenna numbers at
the AP KA and power allocation factors η. The other system parameters are:
B = 200 bits, KE = 3, ρA = 10 dB, ρE = 3 dB, δ = 10
−2, M1 = 30, and
M2 = 20.
approximation is close to the simulation result, which verifies
the accuracy of the proposed approximations. Additionally,
from Fig. 3 we know that the secrecy throughput increases
with the antenna number of the AP. Most importantly, allocat-
ing appropriate power for AN to confuse the eavesdropper can
be beneficial for improving the secrecy throughput, meaning
that the AN-aided transmission scheme is superior to the plain
MRT beamforming scheme by setting an appropriate η. Note
that since the expression of the secrecy throughput under the
case with a multi-antenna AP is intractable to perform further
theoretical analysis and optimization, we will comprehensively
analyze the system performance through the simulations in
Section VI-B.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to show per-
formance of the short-packet communication for secure IoT
applications. The parameter settings are as follows, unless
otherwise specified: B = 200, δ = 10−2, KA = 2, KE = 3,
ρA = 10 dB, ρE = 3 dB, η = 0.7, M1 = 10, and M2 = 20.
All the simulation results shown in this paper are obtained by
averaging over 100, 000 channel realizations.
A. Single-Antenna Case
Fig. 4 depicts the average secrecy throughput obtained by
the simulation versus the blocklength N and the transmitted
bit number per block B under the case with a single-antenna
AP. For each given B, the star markers in Fig. 4 present the
optimal blocklength and secrecy throughput obtained from the
proposed analytical approximations. From Fig. 4, it can be
clearly seen that the analytical results coincide well with the
simulations, and the method proposed in Theorem 2 can be
used to accurately find the optimal blocklength for secrecy
throughput maximization. Moreover, for each fixed B, it can
be observed from Fig. 4 that the secrecy throughput is a quasi-
concave function of the relaxed continuous blocklength, and
Fig. 4. The average secrecy throughput T obtained by the simulation
versus blocklength N and the transmitted bit number per block B under the
case with a single-antenna AP, where the star markers denote the optimal
blocklength obtained by Theorem 2 and the corresponding approximated
secrecy throughput given in Proposition 2.
there exists an optimal N which increases with B. Additionally,
the optimal secrecy throughput is also an increasing function
of B.
Fig. 5 plots the optimal secrecy throughput and the cor-
responding optimal blocklength maximizing the throughput
obtained from both the analytical and numerical methods. It
can be seen from Fig. 5 that the analytical results coincide
well with the simulations. Moreover, both the optimal secrecy
throughput and the optimal blocklength remain fixed as the
transmit power P at the AP becomes larger in the high-SNR
regime. This is because the secrecy throughput is no longer
a function of P in the high-SNR regime according to the
analysis in Section III-B. As the system parameters change,
their impacts on the optimum align well with our theoretical
findings in Corollaries 1 and 2 from Fig. 5.
Fig. 6 depicts the optimal average secrecy throughput ob-
tained from Corollary 3 for each fixed transmitted bit number
per block B under the reliability and latency constraints, and
the throughput is set to zero once the problem is infeasible.
From Fig. 6 one can observe that there exists one critical point
and when B exceeds this point the optimal secrecy throughput
returns to zero. This is because, in order to maintain a fixed
decoding error probability ζǫ , the blocklength N should be
increased when a larger B is demanded. However, N cannot
be arbitrarily large due to the imposed latency constraint.
Therefore, once B is larger than its critical point it will be
infeasible to find a blocklength satisfying both the reliability
and latency constraints. Furthermore, it can be observed from
Fig. 6 that both the optimal secrecy throughput and the
critical point become smaller, when the secrecy or reliability
constraints become more stringent or ρE increases. The reason
behind this is that the blocklength is expected to be larger
so as to meet the reliability constraint at this time, which
considerably reduces the secrecy information rate.
B. Multi-Antenna Case
In Fig. 7, the impact of the antenna number of the AP
KA on the average secrecy throughput under the MRT beam-
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Fig. 5. (a) The optimal secrecy throughput and (b) the corresponding optimal
blocklength versus the transmit power P at the AP under different system
parameters with ρA/P = 10 dB and ρE/P = 3 dB, where the lines are
obtained through the proposed analytical approximation method in Theorem
2 and Proposition 2 while the markers are attained from the simulations and
one-dimensional search.
forming scheme (η = 1) is presented. The dashed lines in
Fig. 7 denote the secrecy throughput for the asymptotic case
with infinite blocklength, which are evaluated according to
TN→∞ = B
N
P{γA > γE } as in Section III-C. According to
Fig. 7, when N > 600 the secrecy throughput with finite
blocklength coding coincides well with its infinite-blocklength
counterpart especially for KA ≥ 3. In light of this observation,
we know that adding more antennas at the AP can compensate
for the performance loss incurred by short-packet commu-
nications in a way. Moreover, it can be observed from Fig.
7 that increasing KA can significantly improve the secrecy
throughput. In particular, the maximum secrecy throughput
gets approximately doubled when the antenna number of the
AP increases from one to two, which shows the significant per-
formance improvement provided by the extra spatial degrees
of freedom. Fig. 7 also shows that the optimal blocklength for
secrecy throughput maximization decreases as KA increases.
The reason behind this is that reducing transmission latency
so as to maximize the secrecy rate is more favorable than
mitigating the decoding error, when the AP can beam at the
Fig. 6. The optimal average secrecy throughput versus the transmitted bit
number per block B under the reliability and latency constraints, where KE =
1 and ζN = 400 channel uses.
Fig. 7. The average secrecy throughput T versus blocklength N with different
antenna numbers at the AP KA, where the dashed lines denote the secrecy
throughput for the asymptotic case with infinite blocklength and η = 1.
actuator using MRT and reduce the information leakage to the
eavesdropper with more equipped antennas.
Fig. 8 shows the impact of the power allocation on the
secrecy throughput in the multi-antenna case with the AN-
aided transmission scheme. It can be seen that the power
allocation factor η indeed plays an important role in max-
imizing the secrecy throughput and there exits an optimal
η∗ to maximize the throughput. From Fig. 8, η∗ increases
as the total transmitted bit number per block B becomes
larger, while it decreases as the antenna number of the AP
KA and the blocklength N increase. The reason behind this
is that the decoding error probability is a decreasing function
of KA and N while it increases as B becomes larger. When
the decoding error probability is large, it is favorable to
allocate more power to the information-bearing signal rather
than the AN to mitigate the decoding error. Therefore, η∗
increases when the decoding performance deteriorates. On the
contrary, when a smaller decoding error probability is met, η∗
is expected to decrease so as to inject more AN signal for
secrecy enhancement.
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Fig. 8. The average secrecy throughput T versus the power allocation factor
η in the multi-antenna case.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive study
on the average secrecy throughput of short-packet com-
munications for secure IoT applications with an external
multi-antenna eavesdropper. In particular, an analytical frame-
work has been proposed to approximate the average secrecy
throughput with finite blocklength. Specifically, we have first
investigated the case with a single-antenna AP, where the
secrecy throughput has been approximated in the closed form.
Based on the closed-form expression, we have analytically ob-
tained the optimal blocklength in terms of secrecy throughput
maximization, and the impacts of the system parameters as
well as the reliability and latency constraints on the optimum
have been further analyzed. Moreover, the proposed theoretical
approximation method has also been extended to the scenario
where the AP has multiple antennas and adopts an AN-aided
transmission scheme. Numerical results verify the accuracy of
the proposed approximation method and show that equipping
multiple antennas at the transmitter can effectively improve
the secrecy throughput and reduce the optimal blocklength
in short-packet communications. The performance of secure
short-packet communications for mission-critical or uRLLC
IoT applications has been comprehensively evaluated in our
paper. One promising future direction is to study the perfor-
mance of secure mMTC IoT applications with large numbers
of users. Another one is to introduce relaying nodes and
investigate the reliability-latency tradeoff in secure cooperative
IoT networks with short-packet transmission.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Substituting (12) into (5) yields
T ≈ B
Nρ
KE
E
Γ(KE )
∫ ∞
0
y
KE−1e−
(
x0(y)
ρA
+
y
ρE
)
dy. (37)
However, due to the complicated form of x0(y) in (8), it is still
hard to obtain a closed-form expression for (37). By noticing
that VE approaches 1 when γE becomes sufficiently large, we
propose to further approximate the secrecy throughput in (37)
as follows:
T ≈ B
Nρ
KE
E
Γ(KE)
( ∫ M1
0
y
KE−1e−
(
x0(y)
ρA
+
y
ρE
)
dy︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Ω1
+
∫ ∞
M1
y
KE−1e−
(
̟1 (1+y)−1
ρA
+
y
ρE
)
dy︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Ω2
)
. (38)
By leveraging Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature [38], integral
Ω1 can be approximated as follows:
Ω1 ≈ M1
2
M2∑
n=1
(
̺M2 f
(
M1
2
(tn + 1)
) √
1 − t2n
)
. (39)
According to [34, eq. (3.351.2)], we have
Ω2 =
1
̟
KE
2
e
−̟1−1
ρA Γ(KE, ̟2M1). (40)
The proof is complete by substituting (39) and (40) into (38).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To find the optimal blocklength maximizing the secrecy
throughput, we first relax the integer N as a positive real
number. Then the partial derivative of the secrecy throughput
T in (14) w.r.t. N can be found as follows:
∂T
∂N
=
B
N2 (ρE̟2)KE
e
−̟1−1
ρA · Ξ(N). (41)
Since the factor B
N2(ρE̟2)KE e
−̟1−1
ρA > 0 in (41) for N ∈ (0,∞),
the sign of ∂T
∂N
only depends on that of Ξ(N).
As for function Ξ(N), we can easily check that it is a
decreasing function of N ∈ (0,∞) by noting that ̟1
̟2
is an
increasing function of ̟1. Moreover, we have lim
N→0+
Ξ(N) > 0
while lim
N→∞
Ξ(N) < 0. Therefore, we conclude that the se-
crecy throughput T first increases and then decreases with
N ∈ (0,∞), which is thereby a quasi-concave function [39,
Sec. 3.4.2] of the continuous N . The optimal N (the relaxed
continuous value) maximizing T can be found as the unique
zero-crossing point of Ξ(N). The proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
According to the derivative rule for implicit functions with
Ξ(N) = 0, the impact of any parameter χ on N∗ can be
analyzed through
dN
dχ
= − ∂Ξ/∂ χ
∂Ξ/∂N . (42)
From Theorem 2, we already have ∂Ξ
∂N
< 0. Therefore, the sign
of dN
dχ
only depends on that of ∂Ξ
∂χ
. The behavior N∗ when the
system parameters change is then discussed as follows:
1) N∗ w.r.t. δ: When δ < 0.5, we know that Q−1(δ) > 0 is
a decreasing function of δ. It is easy to show that Ξ(N) is a
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decreasing function of δ < 0.5, i.e., ∂Ξ
∂δ
< 0, which thereby
leads to dN
dδ
< 0 for δ < 0.5.
2) N∗ w.r.t. P and ρA: Since Ξ(ρA) ∝ 1ρA
(
1 + KE
̟2
)
=
1
ρA
+
KE
̟1+ρA/ρE , we have
∂Ξ
∂χ
< 0 for χ ∈ {P, ρA}, which thereby
leads to dN
dχ
< 0 for χ ∈ {P, ρA}.
3) N∗ w.r.t. ρE , KE , and B: From (18), it can be easily
seen that Ξ(N) is an increasing function of ρE , KE , and B,
i.e., ∂Ξ
∂χ
> 0 for χ ∈ {ρE,KE, B}, which thereby leads to
dN
dχ
> 0 for χ ∈ {ρE,KE, B}.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
According to the chain rule of derivative, the impact of any
parameter χ on T ∗ , T (N∗(χ), χ) can be analyzed through
dT ∗
dχ
=
∂T
∂N

N=N∗
× dN
∗
dχ
+
∂T
∂ χ

N=N∗
=
∂T
∂ χ

N=N∗
, (43)
where the second equality follows from the fact that
∂T
∂N

N=N∗
= 0 according to Theorem 2. Therefore, it suffices
to determine the sign of ∂T (N)
∂χ

N=N∗
, and the impact of the
system parameters on T (N∗) is then discussed as follows:
1) T (N∗) w.r.t. δ: Since ̟1 is a decreasing function of δ, it
is easy to show that T increases with δ, i.e., ∂T
∂δ
> 0 for any
N > 0, which thereby leads to dT
∗
dδ
> 0.
2) T (N∗) w.r.t. P and ρA: When δ < 0.5, it is easy to check
from (14) that T is an increasing function of χ ∈ {P, ρA} since
the condition ̟1 − 1 > 0 holds for this case. Therefore, we
have dT
∗
dχ
> 0 for χ ∈ {P, ρA} when δ < 0.5.
3) T (N∗) w.r.t. B: The partial derivative of T w.r.t. B is first
calculated as follows:
∂T
∂B
=
1
N (ρE̟2)KE
e
−̟1−1
ρA
(
1 − ̟1
ρA
(
1 +
KE
̟2
)
B
N
ln2
)
. (44)
According to the fact that Ξ(N∗) = 0 from Theorem 2, we
further obtain
∂T
∂B

N=N∗
=
1
N (ρE̟2)KE
e
−̟1−1
ρA
̟1
ρA
(
1 +
KE
̟2
)
Q−1(δ)
2
√
N

N=N∗
> 0,
(45)
which finally yields dT
∗
dB
> 0 from (43).
4) T (N∗) w.r.t. ρE and KE : From (14), it can be easily seen
that T is a decreasing function of ρE and KE , i.e.,
∂T
∂χ
< 0 for
any N > 0 and χ ∈ {ρE,KE }, which thereby leads to dT ∗dχ < 0
for χ ∈ {ρE,KE }.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
By using partial integration, the secrecy throughput in (28)
can be further calculated as follows:
T = − B
N
∫ ∞
0
FγE (y)dΨ(y)
=
B
N
( ∫ M1
0
FγE (y) fγA (x0(y)) x′0(y)dy︸                                    ︷︷                                    ︸
Φ1
+
∫ ∞
M1
FγE (y) fγA (x0(y)) x′0(y)dy︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
Φ2
)
, (46)
where M1 is a sufficiently large parameter as in the single-
antenna case.
The integral Φ1 in (46) can be approximated via Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature as
Φ1 ≈ M1
2
M2∑
n=1
(
̺M2g
(
M1
2
(tn + 1)
) √
1 − t2n
)
. (47)
Since M1 is sufficiently large, we approximate x0(y) and x′0(y)
in integral Φ2 of (46) as x0(y) ≈ ̟1(1+ y)−1 and x′0(y) ≈ ̟1,
respectively. Then, the integral Φ2 can be approximated as
Φ2 ≈
∫ ∞
M1
FγE (y) fγA (̟1(1 + y) − 1)̟1dy
=
1
Γ(KA)
Γ
(
KA,
̟1(M1 + 1) − 1
ηρA
)
− ̟1e
−̟1−1
ηρA
(ηρA)KAΓ(KA)
Φ3,
(48)
where
Φ3 ,
∫ ∞
M1
(̟1y +̟1 − 1)KA−1e−̟3y
KE∑
n=1
An(y)
(n − 1)!
(
y
ηρE
)n−1
dy
=
KA−1∑
p=0
(
KA − 1
p
) (
̟1
̟1 − 1
)p KE∑
n=1
(̟1 − 1)KA−1
(n − 1)!(ηρE)n−1
×
∫ ∞
M1
An(y)yn+p−1e−̟3ydy︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
Θn
(49)
with ̟3 ,
̟1ρE+ρA
ηρAρE
.
According to different choices of η, KA, and KE , the
calculation of integral Θn in (49) can be further discussed
as follows:
1) The case of η = 1: In this case, the AP allocates all
the transmitting power to the information-bearing signal and
there is no injected AN. Since τ = 0 under this situation, we
always have An(x) = 1 according to (30). By leveraging [34,
eq. (3.351.2)], integral Θn is calculated as follows:
Θn = Θ1,n ,
1
̟
n+p
3
Γ(n + p, ̟3M1), for 1 ≤ n ≤ KE . (50)
2) The case of η , 1 and KE < KA: When the antenna
number of the AP is larger than that at the eavesdropper, we
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have An(x) =
∑KE −n
m=0 (KA−1m )(τx)m
(1+τx)KA−1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ KE from (30).
The integral Θn for 1 ≤ n ≤ KE now becomes
Θn = Θ2,n
,
KE−n∑
m=0
(
KA − 1
m
)
τm
∫ ∞
M1
y
p+m+n−1
(1 + τy)KA−1 e
−̟3ydy
(a)
=
KE−n∑
m=0
(
KA − 1
m
)
τme−̟3M1
(1 + τM1)KA−1
×
p+m+n−1∑
q=0
(
p + m + n − 1
q
)
M
p+m+n−1−q
1
Φ4, (51)
where step (a) follows from the variable change z = y − M1
and the binomial theorem, and
Φ4
,
∫ ∞
0
zq
(1 + τ
1+τM1
z)KA−1 e
−̟3ydz
(b)
=
(
1 + τM1
τ
)q+1 ∫ ∞
0
tq
(1 + t)KA−1 e
− 1+τM1
τ
̟3tdt
(c)
=
(
1 + τM1
τ
)q+1
Γ(q + 1)U
(
q + 1, q − KA + 3,
1 + τM1
τ
̟3
)
(52)
where steps (b) and (c) follow from the variable change t =
τ
1+τM1
z and [34, eq. (9.211.4)], respectively.
3) The case of η , 1 and KE ≥ KA: When the eavesdropper
has more antennas than the AP, according to (30) the integral
Θn now takes the form of
Θn =
{
Θ1,n, 1 ≤ n ≤ KE − KA + 1,
Θ2,n, KE − KA + 2 ≤ n ≤ KE .
(53)
The proof is complete by substituting (47)–(49) into (46).
REFERENCES
[1] G. Durisi, T. Koch, and P. Popovski, “Toward massive, ultrareliable, and
low-latency wireless communication with short packets,” Proc. IEEE,
vol. 104, no. 9, pp. 1711–1726, Sep. 2016.
[2] P. Schulz, M. Matthe, H. Klessig, M. Simsek, G. Fettweis, J. Ansari,
S. A. Ashraf, B. Almeroth, J. Voigt, I. Riedel, A. Puschmann,
A. Mitschele-Thiel, M. Muller, T. Elste, and M. Windisch, “Latency
critical IoT applications in 5G: Perspective on the design of radio
interface and network architecture,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 2,
pp. 70–78, Feb. 2017.
[3] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and
M. Ayyash, “Internet of Things: A survey on enabling technologies,
protocols, and applications,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 2347–2376, 4th Quart., 2015.
[4] P. Popovski, “Ultra-reliable communication in 5G wireless systems,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. 5G Ubiquitous Connectivity, Levi, Finland, Nov.
2014, pp. 146–151.
[5] C. Bockelmann, N. Pratas, H. Nikopour, K. Au, T. Svensson, C. Ste-
fanovic, P. Popovski, and A. Dekorsy, “Massive machine-type commu-
nications in 5G: Physical and MAC-layer solutions,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 59–65, Sep. 2016.
[6] J. Liu and W. Sun, “Smart attacks against intelligent wearables in people-
centric Internet of Things,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 12, pp.
44–49, Dec. 2016.
[7] D. He, R. Ye, S. Chan, M. Guizani, and Y. Xu, “Privacy in the Internet
of Things for smart healthcare,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 4,
pp. 38–44, Apr. 2018.
[8] A. Barki, A. Bouabdallah, S. Gharout, and J. Traoré, “M2M security:
Challenges and solutions,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 1241–1254, 2nd Quart., 2016.
[9] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. S. Silva, “Security for the Internet of
Things: A survey of existing protocols and open research issues,” IEEE
Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 3rd Quart., 2015.
[10] H. V. Poor, “Information and inference in the wireless physical layer,”
IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 40–47, Feb. 2012.
[11] H. V. Poor and R. F. Schaefer, “Wireless physical layer security,” Proc.
Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., vol. 114, no. 1, pp. 19–26, Jan. 2017.
[12] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Information
Theory to Security Engineering. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2011.
[13] F. Boccardi, R. W. Heath, A. Lozano, T. L. Marzetta, and P. Popovski,
“Five disruptive technology directions for 5G,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 74–80, Feb. 2014.
[14] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. L. Swindlehurst,
“Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks: A
survey,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550–1573,
3rd Quart., 2014.
[15] A. Mukherjee, “Physical-layer security in the Internet of Things: Sensing
and communication confidentiality under resource constraints,” Proc.
IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1747–1761, Oct. 2015.
[16] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. D. Renzo,
“Safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks using physical
layer security,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 20–27, Apr.
2015.
[17] Y. Liu, H. H. Chen, and L. Wang, “Physical layer security for next
generation wireless networks: Theories, technologies, and challenges,”
IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 347–376, 1st Quart.,
2017.
[18] Y. Polyanskiy, H. V. Poor, and S. Verdu, “Channel coding rate in the
finite blocklength regime,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 5, pp.
2307–2359, May 2010.
[19] W. Yang, G. Durisi, T. Koch, and Y. Polyanskiy, “Quasi-static multiple-
antenna fading channels at finite blocklength,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 60, no. 7, pp. 4232–4265, Jul. 2014.
[20] G. Durisi, T. Koch, J. Östman, Y. Polyanskiy, and W. Yang, “Short-
packet communications over multiple-antenna Rayleigh-fading chan-
nels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 618–629, Feb. 2016.
[21] B. Makki, T. Svensson, and M. Zorzi, “Finite block-length analysis
of the incremental redundancy HARQ,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.,
vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 529–532, Oct. 2014.
[22] ——, “Wireless energy and information transmission using feedback:
Infinite and finite block-length analysis,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64,
no. 12, pp. 5304–5318, Dec. 2016.
[23] O. L. A. López, H. Alves, R. D. Souza, and E. M. G. Fernández, “Ul-
trareliable short-packet communications with wireless energy transfer,”
IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 387–391, Apr. 2017.
[24] Y. Gu, H. Chen, Y. Li, L. Song, and B. Vucetic, “Short-packet two-
way amplify-and-forward relaying,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 25,
no. 2, pp. 263–267, Feb. 2018.
[25] Y. Yu, H. Chen, Y. Li, Z. Ding, and B. Vucetic, “On the performance of
non-orthogonal multiple access in short-packet communications,” IEEE
Commun. Lett., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 590–593, Mar. 2018.
[26] X. Sun, S. Yan, N. Yang, Z. Ding, C. Shen, and Z. Zhong, “Short-
packet downlink transmission with non-orthogonal multiple access,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 7, pp. 4550–4564, Apr.
2018.
[27] M. Haghifam, M. R. Mili, B. Makki, M. Nasiri-Kenari, and T. Svensson,
“Joint sum rate and error probability optimization: Finite blocklength
analysis,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 726–729,
Dec. 2017.
[28] P. Mary, J.-M. Gorce, A. Unsal, and H. V. Poor, “Finite blocklength
information theory: What is the practical impact on wireless communica-
tions?” in Proc. IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps), Washington,
DC, USA, Dec. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[29] M. Hayashi, “General nonasymptotic and asymptotic formulas in chan-
nel resolvability and identification capacity and their application to the
wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 1562–
1575, Apr. 2006.
[30] V. Y. F. Tan, “Achievable second-order coding rates for the wiretap
channel,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. Syst. (ICCS), Singapore,
Nov. 2012, pp. 65–69.
[31] M. H. Yassaee, M. R. Aref, and A. Gohari, “Non-asymptotic output
statistics of random binning and its applications,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Symp. Inf. Theory, Istanbul, Turkey, Jul. 2013, pp. 1849–1853.
14
[32] W. Yang, R. F. Schaefer, and H. V. Poor, “Finite-blocklength bounds
for wiretap channels,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT),
Barcelona, Spain, Jul. 2016, pp. 3087–3091.
[33] ——, “Wiretap channels: Nonasymptotic fundamental limits,” Jun.
2017. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.03866v1
[34] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, 7th ed. New York, NY, USA: Academic, 2007.
[35] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[36] T. X. Zheng, H. M. Wang, J. Yuan, D. Towsley, and M. H. Lee, “Multi-
antenna transmission with artificial noise against randomly distributed
eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 4347–4362,
Nov. 2015.
[37] H. Gao, P. J. Smith, and M. V. Clark, “Theoretical reliability of MMSE
linear diversity combining in Rayleigh-fading additive interference chan-
nels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 666–672, May 1998.
[38] F. B. Hildebrand, Introduction to Numerical Analysis, 2nd ed. Mineola,
NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987.
[39] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
